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A Return to the Past
The last eight months have seen a resumption of violent 
clashes in southeastern Turkey between Turkish security 
forces and Kurdish armed groups. While initial analysis 
suggested that a return to the peace process might be pos-
sible in the mid term, the current escalation in violence, 
rhetoric, and regional dynamics makes a quick fix highly 
unlikely. What many believe began as an extension of 
the election campaign of Turkey’s governing Justice and 
Development Party (AKP) has now turned into a situation 
that starkly resembles the dark days of Turkey’s civil war 
in the early 1990s.
At that time, as war raged through Turkey’s Kurdish-
dominated areas, both the Kurdish resistance movement 
– the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) – and the Turk-
ish state employed a strategy of repression and counter 
violence, both of which left the civilian population as 
the main victims. At least forty thousand people died, 
thousands were internally displaced through the Turkish 
state’s scorched-earth policy, and many people simply 
disappeared. Turkey’s current prime minister, Ahmet  
Davutoglu, evoked this time at an election rally last Oc-
tober, saying that it was his party, the AKP, that had man-
aged to overcome the ominous era when “white Toros” 
were seen in the streets. (He was referring to the Renault 
12s driven by the state’s infamous JITEM intelligence 
agency, which came to symbolize a state that killed and 
“disappeared” its own citizens.) It is also true, however, 
that it was the AKP’s hard-line nationalist policy that re-
cently enlisted the state’s security apparatus to once again 
conduct an open war against the PKK.
The state had pursued negotiations with the PKK in 
different formats since 2009, and some advances were 
made on cultural rights such as the right to speak and 
teach Kurdish. Little progress was made on hard topics 
such as partial autonomy, however, and negotiations 
were marred by both a lack of formal structure and of a 
time line, as well as by the power asymmetries between 
the parties. The AKP had initially hoped to win Kurdish 
voters by promising reforms, economic investment, and 
partial autonomy. Relations deteriorated rapidly in late 
2014, however, with the violent spillover of the Syrian 
war in the Syrian-Kurdish town of Kobani, which PKK 
and PYD fighters had successfully defended under US air 
cover against forces of the Islamic State (ISIS).
The peace process began to break down as the pro-
Kurdish, leftist Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP) aban-
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The bomb that went off in downtown Ankara on March 13, killing 37 people, was a 
stark reminder that war has returned to Turkey. The second such attack within one 
month, it clearly shows that the conflict has the capacity to engulf all of Turkey. With 
the peace process in a shambles and the violent spillover from Syria intensifying, the 
resurgence of the Turkish-Kurdish conflict almost makes it seem as if the country has 
traveled back in time to the height of the civil war in the 1990s.
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doned its position to support the bid of President Recep 
Tayyip Erdogan to transform Turkey’s parliamentary 
system into a  presidential one. A framework agreement 
(the Dolmabahce Agreement) signed in February 2015 as 
a last attempt by both sides to salvage the process was 
quickly disavowed by both the Turkish president and PKK 
hardliners. On June 11, 2015 the PKK announced an end 
to its ninth unilateral ceasefire, arguing that the govern-
ment had used the lull in fighting to establish tighter secu-
rity control in the region. On June 24, after a PKK-aligned 
group killed two police officers, the state started aerial 
bombardments against PKK positions in northern Iraq, 
where the PKK has its military headquarters in the Qandil 
mountain ridge. The PKK mobilized its armed youth wing, 
the Patriotic Revolutionary Youth Movement (YDG-H), 
which erected barricades and dug mined trenches in 
several Turkish cities in the southeast.
The AKP, driven by its will to win back the absolute ma-
jority that it had lost in the June parliamentary elections – 
due to the high turnout in support of the pro-Kurdish HDP 
(13 percent) – started a violent and ongoing campaign 
criminalizing HDP party leaders and supporters for their 
alleged links to the PKK. After early elections last Novem-
ber swept the AKP back into power with a single-party 
majority, the government vowed that it would never aban-
don the peace process, while at the same time intensify-
ing the campaign of arrests and military violence against 
the PKK and its  supporters. 
The Ankara bombing of March 13, 2016 signals that the 
conflict is now coming to the western part of the country. 
The group that seems to be behind the attack claims it 
operates independently of the PKK, but the Turkish gov-
ernment nonetheless considers it a PKK subsidiary. This 
has the potential to escalate further. Certainly, both the 
government and the PKK now state plainly that there is 
no going back to the peace process as it once was.
Who’s Who in Turkish and Syrian Kurdistan 
PKK (Partiya Karkerên Kurdistanê, or Kurdistan Workers’ Party): Founded by Abdullah Öcalan in 1978 with the goal 
of establishing an independent Kurdish state, the PKK has meanwhile changed its political goals and brought forth 
a myriad of other organizations, not only in Turkey but also in the neighboring countries of Iran, Iraq, and Syria and 
within the European diaspora. According to ideological guidelines, the PKK has given up the demand for a Kurdish 
state and now seeks to establish what Öcalan calls “Democratic Confederalism” – a sort of Soviet republic under 
one-party rule in which all citizens would be included in decision making for their local communities through grass-
roots democracy. Such an order is foreseen as transcending parliamentary democracy as well as the nation state 
while addressing democracy deficits for the whole population of the respective countries.
KCK (Koma Civakên Kurdistan, or Group of Communities in Kurdistan): The KCK acts as the umbrella structure of all 
PKK-affiliated organizations, be they military or civil (such as NGOs, labor unions, and political parties).
PYD (Partiya Yekitîya Demokrat, or Democratic Union Party): Established in 2003, the PYD is the KCK’s party in 
Syria. It is led by Salih Muslim. The PYD adheres to the same ideology as the PKK and coordinates closely with the 
KCK leadership. Initially tolerated by the Assad regime as a way to control the Kurdish “masses,” the PYD came 
under pressure when Syrian-Turkish relations warmed after 2007. When the Syrian uprising started in 2011, however, 
the PYD struck a deal with the Assad regime that guaranteed it quasi-autonomy in the north of the country in ex-
change for not taking part in the fight against the regime and for suppressing protest. The PYD used its armed wing, 
the YPG/YPJ (Yekîneyên Parastina Gel, or Syrian Kurdish People’s Protection Units), to secure the area and later 
aligned with Arab Sunni groups and others loyal to the regime, which now form the Syrian Democratic Forces.
HDP (Halkların Demokratik Partisi, or Peoples’ Democratic Party): An alliance of Turkish and Kurdish left parties, 
that managed to clear the threshold for representation in Turkish parliament, garnering 13.1 percent of the vote in 
the June 2015 election. In the snap elections of November 2015 it fell back to 10.7 percent. The party is led by two 
co-chairs: Selahattin Demirtaş and Figen Yüksekdag. The party adheres to the revised PKK ideology of PKK leader 
Abdullah Öcalan: that the Kurdish issue can only be solved within a more democratic Turkey.
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How Kurdish Success in Syria Stymies  
Kurdish Peace in Turkey
The reasons for the foundering peace process are to be 
found both in Turkey and in Syria, where the interests of 
the PKK and of the Turkish government are most sharply 
at odds. With the Syrian-Russian offensive in northern 
Syria intensifying since January 2016, Kurdish forces – 
under the Syrian Kurdish Democratic Union Party (PYD) 
– have emerged as the most important power broker, 
able to exert massive influence over the future course 
of the Syrian war. This newly won strength has violent 
repercussions for the Kurdish population within Turkey, 
however.
Both the Turkish government and the PKK know – in 
theory – that this conflict cannot be won militarily. There 
has been no lack of trying during the last twenty years. 
When the AKP first came to power in 2002, Erdogan’s 
party viewed the repression of the Kurds as part of the 
same repressive state structure that had also targeted its 
own Islamist predecessors. Indeed, its initial willingness 
to transcend the ethnic Turkish-Kurdish divide was what 
secured the AKP a big constituency among conserva-
tive Kurdish voters, a constituency that has by now been 
starkly diminished. The AKP understood the Kurdish 
problem mainly as an economic one. It invested heavily 
in areas that had long been economically marginalized, 
and in doing so secured support especially from the newly 
strengthened Kurdish middle class.
As the AKP’s foot-dragging in the official peace talks 
became more and more evident, however, Kurdish voters 
turned away from the party. Kurdish votes for the AKP 
never again reached the one-time high of the initial 2002 
elections. Particularly in the summer election of 2015 that 
cost the AKP its majority and propelled the HDP into the 
national parliament, Kurdish voters made it clear that 
they had lost all trust. It seemed as if the Turkish govern-
ment could never fully decide if it wanted to conclude the 
peace process in earnest – and, in doing so, win the Kurds’ 
allegiance – or if it preferred to pander to the strong Turk-
ish nationalist undercurrent that existed even within the 
AKP and for whom any concessions to the PKK amounted 
to treason.
It was regional developments across the Syrian and 
Iraqi borders that finally drove the relationship to its na-
dir. PKK-aligned forces from the Syrian Kurdish People’s 
Protection Units (YPG/YPJ) took the strategically im-
portant border town of Tal Abyad in June 2015. From this 
position they came closer than ever to advancing their 
positions across the Euphrates river and thereby closing 
the gap that existed between their three (now four) can-
tons in northern Syria, guaranteeing them a  contiguous 
 territory. For the Turkish government, this not only meant 
that the YPG would control the complete border region. 
It also meant losing the last border crossing – Bab as-
Salameh/Öncüpinar – which was a vital supply route to 
the northern Syrian city of Aleppo for Turkey’s own allies 
among the Syrian rebels, including the Jaysh al-Fatah 
coalition (the Army of Conquest). 
The PKK, buoyed by victory, was not willing to bow to 
Turkish demands that it give up its military positions in 
Tal Abyad. Ankara had tried to bargain with the Syrian-
Kurdish leader Salih Muslim, who was invited several 
times to Ankara, hoping that it could pry the PYD away 
from the PKK and persuade it not to cross the Euphra-
tes, but to no avail. The movement was now in a better 
position than ever. Kurds had taken substantial steps to 
self-rule in northern Syria and had strengthened their 
position in northern Iraq. They had also, significantly, 
burnished their international image by fighting ISIS. For 
its part, the PKK in Turkey had used the years of relative 
quiet in Turkish Kurdistan to work toward a proto-state, 
establishing itself firmly through various means.
The Return of the White Toros?
Whoever comes today to the city of Diyarbakir (Amed, in 
Kurmancı-Kurdish) will find both municipal structures 
and a society for which Kurdish autonomy is not a distant 
dream but a manifest destiny. Diyarbakir is not only the 
most important Kurdish city in Turkey’s southeast; it is 
also the secret capital of northern Kurdistan, the region 
the Kurds call Bakur. Over the last twenty years the 
Kurdish movement has reached an unprecedented level 
of cohesion among the Kurdish population. It spans far 
beyond purely military structures such as the PKK and 
its armed wing, the People’s Defense Forces (HPG). Most 
segments of society, from the HDP-dominated munici-
palities to civil society organizations, see themselves as 
part of the would-be Kurdish state. In such a system, the 
Turkish state, which is represented through a governor 
appointed by Ankara and the much-hated security forces, 
serve as a reminder of the state’s oppressive relationship 
with its Kurdish citizens. 
Even for the younger generation of Kurds who do not 
remember the 1990s and its massive military operations, 
the state has now ensured that they see their future in a 
Kurdish solution – one with no or relatively diminished 
relations with the Turkish central state. Because, while 
the prime minister may claim that the dark days of state 
sponsored violence are over, many Kurds have a very 
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different impression. Most of them have a relatively 
 clear-eyed understanding of what the state is willing to 
do to keep them in check. 
Turkish security forces have in recent operations 
displayed the very attitudes that the prime minister 
claimed belong to the past. Time and again footage 
surfaces of security forces dragging the bodies of killed 
militants through the streets; there are photographs on 
which soldiers pose above the bodies of naked Kurdish 
female fighters. Security forces spray demeaning graffiti 
on houses, or label entire town populations as traitors. 
Civilians and journalists have been targeted, even when 
they carry white flags. Turkish forces lacking the proper 
training and equipment for urban warfare are using tanks 
and artillery to shell entire city quarters, driving up the 
civilian death toll. 
Dubious legal charges – such as the offense of “support-
ing a terrorist group without being a member” – open the 
door to excessive arrests and legal action. While press 
freedom is already limited in Turkey, the government has 
reached new lows in trying to bully journalists, talk show 
hosts, and others into sticking to the official narrative of 
what is going on in the southeast. Accordingly, for many 
Turks who live in other parts of the vast country, the 
conflict has – until the recent terror attacks – been very 
distant indeed. And while the government claims that it is 
fighting against “terrorists,” the civilian Kurdish popula-
tion bears the brunt of the violence while security forces 
operate with de facto impunity.
Economic Modernization as Cure-All
In a February 2016 speech in the southeastern city of 
Mardin, Prime Minister Davutoglu announced a ten-point 
plan to fight terror and reanimate some sort of peace 
process. One of the points he mentioned was tackling 
impunity among security forces. Given, however, that 
human rights organizations are reporting government ob-
structionism in legal proceedings against former security 
officials accused of crimes committed in the 1990s, the 
state’s commitment to holding security forces accountable 
for such actions is questionable at best. 
The approach outlined by the prime minister also clearly 
shows that the government either fails to understand the 
main grievances of the Kurdish population or is unwilling 
to address them due to nationalist sentiment in the rest of 
the country. The plan makes clear that the government in-
tends to sideline the PKK by addressing the public directly, 
initiating a consultation process over the constitution.
The key components of the plan are massive economic 
investments and incentives, large-scale urban renewal 
projects, and democratic reforms through an overhaul 
of the constitution. The Turkish government would not 
be the first to create a peace process with a propped-up 
movement or “the people” instead of negotiating with a 
partner it dislikes. In this scenario, the government would 
try to win over key leaders in Kurdish communities, some 
of which were already close to the AKP before 2014, and 
offer some concessions to the Kurds. 
Some initial promises have already been made, for 
example, that Kurdish cities will be allowed again to 
officially use their original Kurdish names. While such 
symbols will have a positive impact, they are not enough. 
These strategies are born out of an analysis that fails to 
understand how deeply engrained Kurdish aspirations 
have become. 
The AKP doctrine of economic modernization as a 
cure-all is very present in Davutoglu’s speech, where he 
details various economic incentives the government will 
offer to Kurdish areas. The government is willing to make 
concessions on the cultural front but refuses to discuss 
any form of autonomy or self-rule that goes beyond loos-
sening administrative and financial concentration. 
What the Kurds want, however, is true decision-mak-
ing power, and PKK cadres see this as a means of en-
trenching themselves further in the region. The govern-
ment believes that Kurdish support for the PKK is mainly 
the result of pressure the group exerts on the population 
– in other words, of strong-arm tactics. While it is true that 
the PKK does have a record of coercing and suppressing 
civil society and those who stand against it, however, the 
government also underestimates the genuine public sup-
port the movement receives, simply for the fact that it is 
seen as the only capable defender of Kurdish rights in the 
face of state brutality.
The government rightly takes issue with the fact that 
the PKK has used the lull in fighting to build up a new mi-
litia: the Patriotic Revolutionary Youth Movement (YDG-
H). The PKK claims that it does not fully control YDG-H 
units and that these consist of disenfranchised youth who 
have taken to the streets on their own steam. Previous 
statements by the PKK, however, point to the fact that the 
YDG-H was established under its command. 
Moreover, the statute of the Group of Communities in 
Kurdistan (KCK) actually lists it explicitly as a member 
organization. It seems clear that the PKK has trained 
and equipped the youth group, and if there was no full 
control from the central command structures, this was 
likely deliberate. In an apparent move to rectify this and 
organize more fighting power, the YDG-H was merged 
in December 2015 with HPG units into the Civil Defense 
Units (YPS), bringing them under tighter PKK control.
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The government has made it a precondition for any ne-
gotiations that the PKK lay down its arms. This is a hard-
line position, one it knows the PKK will never be able to 
fulfill under the current military escalation. It is, however, 
failing to take into account how this will play out on the 
international stage.
The Syria Conundrum
While both the US and the EU pay lip service to Turkey’s 
right to fight the PKK as a terrorist group, this fight is no 
longer about Turkey. It is about the role the Kurds and 
especially the PKK play in the entire region. The Kurdish 
PYD in Syria has now openly aligned itself with Rus-
sia and is at least partially coordinating with the Assad 
regime to fight Turkey’s proxy rebel forces in Syria. The 
US, however, is nowhere closer to dropping the YPG as a 
tactical ally, and the Kurds in Syria may very well be the 
force that holds the key to the future of the Assad regime. 
Within Europe, sympathy for the Kurds – and even for 
the PKK – is growing as the fight against ISIS stays in the 
headlines. 
Turkey, afraid to lose its foothold in Syria, is shelling 
the YPG but without seriously impeding its advances. 
Ankara’s current strategy of degrading the PKK’s military 
abilities within Turkey will likely not be successful either. 
(It should be noted that the PKK has long shifted its prior-
ity to Syria, an area in which the Turkish air force dares 
not venture lest it become a target for the Russians.)
Finally, any Turkish peace process that sidelines the 
PKK would not only lack credibility but also leave the 
main issues unaddressed, as the PKK will continue to  
bear arms within Turkey. Such a process is unlikely to 
produce the desired outcome. Moreover, Kurdish voters  
in Turkey did not return to Erdogan’s AKP party during 
the recent elections, or at least not in large enough num-
bers. This makes it very unlikely that the AKP govern-
ment would benefit politically from any concessions it 
makes to the Kurds.
But while the PKK is in a strategically better position 
in Syria, its fight in Turkey is not without problems. Not 
only are many Kurds unhappy with the fact that the PKK 
has brought its fight to the urban centers, with the state’s 
harsh countermeasures heavily affecting the civilian 
population. Such fighting has also shown that the same 
urban warfare tactics that proved to be successful against 
ISIS in Kobani are now seriously limiting the PKK in Tur-
key, for Turkish forces have a completely different arsenal 
at their disposal. While there is talk among Turkish Kurds 
that, come spring, more experienced PKK forces will come 
down from the mountains, this would only make the fight 
bloodier; the state would likewise step up its response. 
Signs of this escalation are surely the two recent bomb 
attacks in the heart of Ankara on February 17 and March 
13. While the first one, committed by a PKK splinter group, 
targeted soldiers, the second one killed mostly civilians, 
something the PKK has not done since the mid-1990s. If 
this attack did indeed spring from a new strategy, then it 
might very well cost the PKK much of the sympathy the 
YPG/J had garnered over the last two years in its fight 
against ISIS.
In meetings, state officials, AKP members, and repre-
sentatives on the Kurdish side have now entrenched their 
positions and have very little space to maneuver politi-
cally. Lower ranks on both sides parrot the line coming 
from their respective headquarters, even while it is some-
times privately acknowledged that the situation is more 
complex than the official narrative allows. Meanwhile 
the fighting – and the AKP’s pandering to nationalistic 
voters – means that the overall societal climate in Turkey 
is changing. 
After the second Ankara attack, President Erdogan 
called for a broader definition of terrorism to include 
journalists, academics, and politicians. He was clearly 
targeting the pro-Kurdish party HDP, and a process to 
strip the party leadership of its parliamentary immunity 
has been initiated. Orchestrated attacks on HDP offices 
in September 2015, as well as Turkish nationalist mobs 
attacking Kurds and Kurdish businesses throughout the 
country, have helped polarize the political atmosphere 
even further. 
The November election results showed that first-time 
voters were most likely to support the Kurdish HDP and 
the far-right Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) – the 
parties that embody the strongest Kurdish and Turkish 
nationalism. Young people especially are not only radical-
izing but also losing hope that a peaceful solution is pos-
sible. With Turkey’s foreign policy becoming ever more 
desperate and lacking options, the state will continue on 
its current path. The same is true for the PKK, which has 
strategically bound its fate to Russia’s Syria policy, hoping 
that Russia can deliver what the West has denied it for 
decades.
Is there Hope for the Peace Process?
A return to the peace process is possible in theory, but it 
would only serve to manage the conflict and allow for an 
extended ceasefire again. Incentives to do so, however, 
are currently small; hypercharged rhetoric and a lack of 
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international pressure make it unlikely. Moreover, Turkey 
would have to accept that it can no longer control the pro-
cess from a position of strength. Bringing in a third-party 
mediator is something the Kurdish side has desired for a 
long time and which would actually make sense. It would, 
however, also need to include the PYD in the process or at 
least extract guarantees from it. 
Apart from the US and Russia, there are currently 
few players capable of filling this mediating role and 
even fewer who would be willing to do so. To at least 
limit the effects of civil war on the civilian population 
and therefore also decrease the radicalization potential 
among Turkey’s Kurds, bringing international observers 
to the country’s southeast would make sense. Either the 
 Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe 
(OSCE) or the International Committee of the Red Cross 
could play such an impartial role, but it would have to be 
the Turkish government that opens the door for them and 
accepts greater international scrutiny. This is an impor-
tant step the international community – and especially 
the EU and the US – should push for, if one wants to keep 
Turkey from travelling back in time to its bloody past.
Kristian Brakel is an associate fellow in the DGAP’s 
Middle East and North Africa program.
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